Your ADS-B transponder broadcasts your position and identity twice per second to a global network - here's what pilots need to know and what the FAA's PIA program can do about it.
ADS-B was designed for safety, but its open broadcast architecture turned civil aviation into a real-time public surveillance layer - and the FAA's suppression tools only go so far.
The FAA's LADD program masks tail numbers from commercial tracking sites, but a $30 software-defined radio can receive the raw ADS-B signal regardless.
ADS-B broadcasts your aircraft's position to anyone listening - here's what LADD and the Privacy ICAO Address program actually protect, and where they fall short.
The FAA's LADD program lets pilots block their aircraft from public tracking platforms - but independent receiver networks operate outside those rules.
Radio Hangar explores ADS-B Spoofing, the Unauthenticated Broadcast, and Why the System That Sees Every Airplane Will Believe an Airplane That Isn't There.
FlightAware has sued prediction-market operator Kalshi over flight-tracking data and trademark use, raising big questions about who owns the data pilots rely on.
The FAA's Privacy ICAO Address program scrambles database lookups to obscure aircraft identity, but the unencrypted 1090 MHz signal remains visible to anyone with a $25 receiver.
Flight trackers show pilots far more than position data - groundspeed variations, step climbs, and oceanic routing decisions are all readable in real time.