GPS spoofing in the Eastern Mediterranean and Baltic Sea is generating false ADS-B position data - errors exceeding 60 miles - that controllers and pilots cannot easily detect.
How Aireon's space-based ADS-B network, riding 66 Iridium satellites in low Earth orbit, ended decades of blind oceanic air traffic control in November 2019.
GPS spoofing is actively corrupting ADS-B surveillance data in multiple world regions, exposing a foundational gap in modern aviation's traffic picture.
TIS-B relays radar targets to your ADS-B display with up to 15-second latency, and ground station coverage disappears below 3,000–10,000 feet depending on terrain.
Your aircraft broadcasts its position, registration link, and full flight history to anyone with a $50 receiver - here's what the FAA built to address it.
ADS-B broadcasts your aircraft's position to anyone listening - here's what LADD and the Privacy ICAO Address program actually protect, and where they fall short.
TIS-B targets on your ADS-B display are radar-relayed, not direct broadcasts - carrying up to 12 seconds of latency that can place traffic half a mile from where it appears.
TIS-B uplinks radar-derived traffic to ADS-B In receivers, but its position accuracy and latency differ significantly from direct ADS-B targets - and most pilots don't know the difference.
Radio Hangar explores TCAS to ACAS X, the Climb-Climb-Now Voice in the Cockpit, and the Optimized Logic That's Teaching Collision Avoidance to Turn Left Instead of Just Up.
ADS-B broadcasts aircraft positions with no encryption or authentication - here's why it's spoofable and why the system around it still keeps flying safe.