The Miami 767 Touchdown, NTSB Flight Recorder Data, and the Four-Second Throttle Advance That Reopens the Go-Around Decision

The NTSB is actively investigating an unusual sequence captured on the flight data recorder of a Boeing 767 that landed at Miami International Airport: after touchdown, brakes were released, throttles advanced, held forward for four seconds, then returned to idle. The investigation is ongoing and no conclusions have been drawn. The findings may carry lessons about decision-making at the critical transition between flight and ground.

What the Flight Data Recorder Shows

AVweb, citing NTSB data, reported the following post-touchdown sequence: brake release, throttle advance, a four-second hold at increased thrust, then throttle retraction to idle. That is not a normal landing rollout sequence.

In a standard transport-category landing, the direction of throttle travel after main gear contact is either rearward - into the thrust reverser range - or stationary at idle. Throttles do not advance. Everything in the system is working to decelerate the aircraft, not drive it forward.

Ground spoilers typically deploy within one to two seconds of weight-on-wheels. Their job is to collapse residual wing lift and transfer weight onto the wheels, enabling effective braking. Autobrakes engage if set. Thrust reversers deploy. The sequence is entirely oriented toward stopping.

A forward throttle movement during that sequence either represents a go-around attempt or something unintended. The NTSB is working to determine which.

Why Four Seconds Matters at Rollout Speed

A Boeing 767 at typical landing speed - 130 to 140 knots depending on weight - covers approximately 200 to 230 feet per second. Four seconds at that rate equals 800 to 900 feet of runway.

That is not a trivial distance. During those four seconds, if thrust was being added, the net deceleration force was reduced. The aircraft was not stopping as efficiently as it could have been.

The 767 at maximum landing weight reaches approximately 345,000 pounds depending on variant. The kinetic energy that mass carries at landing speed is enormous, and every deceleration system needs to be working in the correct direction from the moment of main gear contact.

The outcome here was not a hull loss - the aircraft completed its arrival at Miami. But the sequence is exactly the kind of data the NTSB investigates: not just accidents, but incidents that reveal decision-making patterns the industry can learn from.

What Could Explain the Throttle Advance

The NTSB has not released conclusions, and several explanations are consistent with the available data.

A rejected go-around. The crew may have initiated a go-around after touchdown, then recognized within four seconds that the aircraft was on the ground with spoilers deployed and reversed the command. This configuration - positive thrust added while ground deceleration systems are active - is one of the more dangerous in aviation.

An autothrottle or automation transient. At the airborne-to-ground mode transition, software logic in highly automated aircraft can produce unexpected behavior. Investigators will examine whether any automated system contributed to the throttle movement.

An unintended manual input. A learned muscle-memory response to something that felt wrong during the flare, immediately recognized and corrected.

The investigation will resolve this. The NTSB begins with data, not with theories, and modern flight data recorders capture hundreds of parameters - throttle position, brake pressure, control surface deflection, engine pressure ratios, weight-on-wheels, spoiler deployment, thrust reverser position - often at multiple samples per second. The full picture is in that data.

The Go-Around Decision Window

This incident highlights a fundamental truth about the landing sequence: the go-around decision must happen before it is needed.

The FAA and virtually every major airline define what are called stabilized approach criteria. If an approach is not on the correct glidepath, at the correct speed, in the correct configuration, with a normal rate of descent by a defined altitude gate, the go-around is mandatory - not discretionary.

The gates are 1,000 feet AGL for instrument conditions and 500 feet AGL for visual conditions. Inside those gates, all criteria must be met or the go-around executes automatically.

The data behind these standards is unambiguous. Approaches that were not stabilized by those gates carry a significantly higher rate of incidents and accidents: runway overruns, hard landings, gear collapses, runway excursions.

Why Pilots Continue Unstabilized Approaches

The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) - the FAA’s voluntary confidential safety reporting database - holds thousands of pilot reports describing the decision to continue an approach that was not meeting stabilized criteria. The stated reasons are consistent across reports: schedule pressure, fatigue, confidence in the ability to recover the approach, and reluctance to absorb the delay a go-around creates.

This is plan continuation bias. The entire flight has been oriented toward landing. The cognitive cost of reversing that plan - particularly under fatigue or time pressure - is higher than most pilots recognize until they have examined it deliberately.

A go-around is not a failure. It is the correct outcome when conditions call for it. The procedure specifies it. Training is built to produce it. And it is safer, without qualification, than a runway overrun or a hard landing that was not ready for the surface.

There is a phrase in airline operations that frames this precisely: the runway behind you is useless. Every foot already rolled over is gone. The available distance is only what remains ahead. If that distance is not sufficient, the go-around should have happened before touchdown.

The Commitment Point on Rollout

For every pilot, regardless of aircraft type, the commitment point is a hard boundary. Once the mains are on the runway, once ground spoilers or flaps are working against forward motion, once weight-on-wheels is confirmed and runway is being used - the go-around window has closed.

From that point, the only correct action is to work every available deceleration tool: brakes, thrust reversers if equipped, and any other system the aircraft provides. Power does not belong in that equation.

The four-second window in the Miami data is a sharp illustration of how quickly events move at rollout speed. Four seconds is 800 feet of runway. The difference between a routine stop and a sequence that investigators cannot yet fully explain.

What the NTSB Investigation Will Produce

The preliminary report, when released, will outline the factual sequence. The final report will include analysis of contributing factors and likely safety recommendations. The NTSB writes for the aviation community, and their reports are worth reading carefully.

All NTSB accident and incident reports are publicly available at ntsb.gov.

Miami International is among the highest-volume wide-body airports in the United States, a major gateway for South American and Caribbean routes. The 767 is one of its most common aircraft types, operated by multiple carriers on both domestic and international routes. The runways are long and built for heavy aircraft. But runway length is finite, and the physics of a transport-category aircraft at landing weight do not allow for correction after the commitment point has passed.

Key Takeaways

The NTSB is investigating a Boeing 767 landing at Miami International Airport where throttles advanced for four seconds after touchdown before returning to idle - an abnormal sequence in a standard rollout.
At landing speed, four seconds equals approximately 800 to 900 feet of runway, during which the aircraft was not decelerating at maximum efficiency.
The investigation will examine whether the throttle movement represents an attempted go-around, an automation transient, or an unintended manual input.
Stabilized approach criteria exist because the data is clear: approaches not meeting standards by 1,000 feet AGL (IMC) or 500 feet AGL (VMC) carry significantly higher incident and accident rates.
Once mains are on the runway and ground deceleration systems are active, the go-around window is closed - the decision must be made before touchdown, not after.