The Kolkata Tail Strike, the Go-Around That Went Wrong, and Why Pitch and Pavement Are a Dangerous Combination on Any Aircraft

An Akasa Air Boeing 737 MAX 8 struck its tail on the runway while executing a go-around at Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose International Airport in Kolkata, India. The aircraft was not lost and no fatalities were reported, but a tail strike is never a minor event - structurally, operationally, or in terms of what it reveals about one of aviation’s most demanding maneuvers. India’s Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) is leading the investigation.

What Is a Tail Strike and Why It Matters

A tail strike occurs when the aft section of the fuselage makes contact with the ground - specifically the underside of the rear fuselage, typically just behind and below the tail cone. It can range from a light graze to hard contact. Either way, the structural implications are serious and not always visible.

The fuselage of a pressurized airliner endures thousands of pressurization cycles over its service life - expanding and contracting with every climb and descent. A tail strike introduces loads the structure was never designed to absorb in that geometry. The result can be deformation, cracking, or damage to the pressure vessel itself.

The most dangerous aspect of tail strike damage is that it can be invisible on a standard walkaround. Sometimes the crew feels or hears a thud transmitted through the airframe. Sometimes the strike is only discovered when maintenance finds scrape marks or deformation during post-flight inspection. Some aircraft carry tail strike sensors, but they don’t catch everything.

When a strike is confirmed or suspected, the aircraft enters a rigorous inspection process and is taken out of service - potentially for days or weeks. Structural engineers get involved. If damage to the pressure vessel is identified, the repair process is extensive and manufacturer-controlled.

Who Is Akasa Air

Akasa Air is a relatively young low-cost carrier based in India. The airline began flight operations in 2022 and built its fleet entirely around the 737 MAX - a calculated bet made as the MAX was rebuilding its commercial reputation after its two-year grounding ended in late 2020. Akasa’s order book runs into the 200-aircraft range, and it has been one of the fastest-growing carriers in one of the fastest-growing aviation markets in the world. This Kolkata incident is a serious mark on what has otherwise been an aggressive growth story.

Why a Go-Around at Kolkata

On any transport category aircraft, there is a maximum pitch angle before the tail contacts the ground. For most transport jets, that number sits in the range of 10 to 12 degrees nose-up pitch while the main gear is still on or near the runway. The exact number is type-specific and part of type rating training.

The 737 MAX 8’s geometry adds a layer worth understanding. The LEAP-1B engines are mounted higher and farther forward under the wing compared to the CFM56 engines on the 737 Next Generation series. That placement was necessary because the LEAP-1B has a significantly larger fan diameter, and the original 737 airframe - designed in the 1960s - sits lower to the ground than its competitors. That same engine geometry was why the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) was developed, to counteract a nose-up pitching moment generated at high angles of attack.

MCAS is not what’s under discussion here. But pitch sensitivity tied to that engine placement is part of the aircraft’s handling characteristics in certain flight regimes, and it is part of the investigative context.

The Go-Around: Where the Risk Actually Lives

The go-around is a safety maneuver. Choosing to go around rather than force a bad approach to a landing is always the right call - far more accidents have resulted from pressing on than from the go-around itself.

But the execution of the go-around is where the risk lives.

During a go-around, the crew is adding significant thrust, pitching the nose up to arrest the descent, reconfiguring flaps and gear, and coordinating with ATC - all at low altitude, with the smallest margin for error of any phase in the approach. The Flight Safety Foundation has documented that a disproportionate share of approach and landing accidents occur not during the approach or landing roll, but during the go-around phase.

The highest-risk variation is the late go-around - one initiated in the flare, when the aircraft is already nose-high, already very close to the pavement, already at reduced airspeed. At that point, the energy state is at its worst. The pitch attitude is already elevated. Adding power rapidly while already nose-high in ground effect leaves the least margin of any point in the entire sequence. That is the scenario that produces tail strikes - and in worse cases, stalls when pitch is pulled through instead of managed.

Airline crews who fly hundreds of approaches per month may execute only a handful of go-arounds per year. It is a maneuver that demands precision and currency, but gets practiced infrequently enough that technique can drift.

Why This Matters Beyond the 737 MAX

The aircraft type matters for understanding the geometry involved. It does not make this incident another chapter in the 2018 and 2019 MCAS accidents. Those events involved a specific automated system failing in specific flight regimes, with flight control authority that crews could not override through the means available to them. The MAX returned to service under substantially revised certification standards, software, and training requirements.

A tail strike during a go-around is a serious incident involving pitch control and technique during a demanding phase of flight. Framing it otherwise would be inaccurate.

And the core lesson applies to every pilot, regardless of aircraft type. A Cessna 172 has very different tail strike geometry than a 737, but the danger of the late go-around is identical. How often do you practice a go-around initiated from the flare - not from a stabilized final, but from the moment the wheels are nearly on the runway? Most go-around training in general aviation starts from a stable approach, which is valuable but not the hardest version. The hardest version is the one where you have committed to the flare and then changed your mind.

Know the pitch attitude that gets your aircraft climbing. Know the pitch attitude that gets you into trouble. Practice the late go-around with an instructor before you need it in the actual environment.

What Investigators Are Looking At

India’s DGCA will examine the flight data recorder, cockpit voice recorder, crew training records, and the aircraft’s maintenance history. The reconstruction will focus on the precise height above the runway when the go-around was initiated, the pitch rate, the thrust application sequence, and whether any technical anomalies were present.

If the findings point to technique, the result will likely be additional go-around training requirements at Akasa and potentially across other MAX operators. If a technical contributing factor is identified, the implications widen. That is how the investigation process is supposed to function.

India’s Aviation Growth and the Safety Equation

India is among the fastest-growing aviation markets in the world, with new airports, expanding infrastructure, and carriers adding aircraft at a pace that demands continuous hiring and training throughput. ICAO and the Flight Safety Foundation have both documented the known risk factor in high-growth environments: training quality, SOP adherence, and safety culture can come under pressure when airlines are scaling at speed.

India’s safety record has improved significantly over the past two decades, and the trajectory is positive. Incidents like this one, when investigated thoroughly, produce the specific corrective actions that continue moving that record in the right direction.

Key Takeaways

An Akasa Air 737 MAX 8 struck its tail on the runway during a go-around at Kolkata’s Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose International Airport; no fatalities were reported and India’s DGCA is investigating.
Tail strike damage can be invisible on external inspection and may compromise the aircraft’s pressure vessel, requiring extensive structural assessment before return to service.
The late go-around - initiated in the flare at low airspeed, nose already high - is the highest-risk variation, and the scenario most likely to produce tail strikes or post-go-around loss of control.
The 737 MAX’s forward-mounted LEAP-1B engines affect pitch handling characteristics; this incident is not related to MCAS, which addressed a separate system failure in a distinct flight regime.
This incident is a reminder for all pilots to practice go-arounds from the flare with an instructor - not just from stabilized final - and to know their aircraft’s pitch limits and climb performance in a degraded energy state.