The Go-Around Trap - Why Pilots Talk Themselves Out of the One Maneuver That Could Save the Flight

The go-around is not technically difficult. Most pilots learn it early, can execute it cleanly, and understand its purpose. The problem is the judgment call that’s supposed to trigger it - and that judgment fails with lethal regularity. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) consistently identifies approach and landing as one of the highest-risk phases of flight, and a recurring thread in accident narratives is an unstabilized approach that the pilot chose not to abandon.

Why Do Pilots Talk Themselves Out of Going Around?

The answer lies in a well-documented cognitive trap called commitment bias. Once a pilot has mentally locked onto landing - configured the airplane, flown ten miles of final, built the entire flight around putting the wheels on a specific runway - the brain shifts from evaluation mode to justification mode. It stops asking “is this approach safe?” and starts asking “how can I make this work?”

The internal bargaining sounds reasonable in the moment. The airspeed is a little fast, but I’ll bleed it off in the flare. I’m a little high, but I can slip it down. The winds shifted, but I’ve handled a crosswind before. Any one of those statements might be defensible in isolation. Stacked together, they describe an approach that is compounding its problems with each passing second.

What Does a Stabilized Approach Actually Require?

Part 121 airline operations use a formal framework called the stabilized approach concept. The standard is built around a defined gate - typically 500 feet AGL in visual conditions - by which the approach must meet all criteria. If it doesn’t, the crew goes around. No discussion, no negotiation.

The criteria at that gate are specific:

• On the correct glide path, tracking the centerline
• Airspeed within approximately 10 knots of the target approach speed
• Descent rate no greater than 1,000 feet per minute
• Final landing configuration established - flaps set, gear down if applicable
• A reasonable expectation that the airplane will cross the threshold at the correct energy state to land safely

If any of those boxes remain unchecked at 500 feet, the correct answer is a go-around - not “let me see how the next hundred feet develop.”

What Happens When Pilots Press In?

Three scenarios that appear repeatedly in NTSB accident reports illustrate how this unfolds.

Scenario one: A pilot arrives at an unfamiliar airport late in the afternoon. The low sun impairs their glide path judgment. They cross the threshold too high and too fast. A go-around was the right call. Instead, they press in. Available runway isn’t sufficient. The airplane departs the far end.

Scenario two: A student on one of their first solo flights notices the airspeed is above target on final. They know it. But they also don’t want to fly another pattern. They land fast, bounce, balloon, and touch down hard enough to stress the nose gear.

Scenario three: An experienced pilot approaches a narrow grass strip with a slight crosswind. They’re right of centerline on short final, close to a tree line. They’ve landed here before. They press in. A wing clips a branch. The outcome is recoverable that day - but the correct call was obvious before they ever crossed the fence.

In each case, the pilot had data indicating the approach wasn’t meeting standards. In each case, the pilot chose to continue. The maneuver that would have resolved the situation was available and known. It simply wasn’t selected.

How Do You Build the Go-Around Habit?

The professional aviation world doesn’t rely on in-the-moment willpower. It builds the decision in advance through procedure. General aviation pilots can apply the same principle.

Brief your criteria out loud before every flight. Not in your head - out loud. Something as simple as: “I will initiate a go-around if I am not stable by 500 feet. No exceptions.” When the standard is stated before departure, you’re not making a decision on final. You’re executing one you already made.

Practice go-arounds deliberately, not reactively. Ask your instructor to call them, or on solo flights, fly patterns with the intention of going around at 500 feet even on a perfectly good approach. The goal is to normalize the maneuver - to make it something you do routinely rather than reluctantly.

Understand what your gates actually mean. At 500 feet, you have meaningful time to build a better approach. At 200 feet, your options are narrowing fast. At 50 feet, you are effectively committed. The lower you allow an unstabilized approach to continue, the more demanding the eventual go-around becomes. The early call is always the better call.

Give yourself permission to fly multiple approaches. Some pilots carry an unspoken pressure to land on the first try - especially with passengers aboard, traffic in the pattern, or fading daylight. That pressure is real, but it doesn’t change the physics. The runway will still be there on the next lap. Flying one more pattern to set up a safe landing is not a failure of efficiency. It is the correct decision.

Will a Go-Around Hurt You on a Checkride?

This concern comes up often, and it deserves a direct answer: no.

The Airmen Certification Standards (ACS) explicitly requires that the pilot make a timely decision to discontinue an approach that isn’t meeting standards. That word - timely - is deliberate. A last-second, forced go-around from fifty feet is not the same as recognizing a deteriorating approach at 500 feet and acting on it cleanly.

Designated Pilot Examiners are not looking for a perfect first approach. They’re evaluating aeronautical decision making. A pilot who recognizes an unstabilized approach, calls it, and executes a go-around correctly is demonstrating exactly the judgment the checkride is designed to assess. What concerns an examiner is the pilot who presses in on a bad approach because they don’t want to admit the approach wasn’t where it needed to be.

The go-around executed at the right moment for the right reason is not a problem on a checkride. It is evidence of the standard.

Key Takeaways

• Commitment bias is the primary reason pilots fail to go around - the brain shifts to justification once it has committed to landing.
• A stabilized approach requires on-glidepath, on-centerline, correct airspeed (within ~10 knots), manageable descent rate (under 1,000 fpm), and proper configuration by 500 feet AGL.
• The three most common go-around failures involve misjudged energy state, self-imposed schedule pressure, and stacking small compromises that individually seem manageable.
• Briefing go-around criteria out loud before every flight pre-commits the decision, removing the need for real-time judgment under pressure.
• On a checkride, a timely go-around demonstrates sound aeronautical decision making - it does not reflect poorly on the applicant.