The Go-Around Decision, the Energy Trap That Catches Good Pilots on Short Final, and Why the NTSB Data Says the Crash Comes After the Correct Call
NTSB data shows go-around accidents often happen during recovery, not the bad approach itself - here's why the energy trap on short final is so dangerous and how to execute correctly.
The go-around is aviation’s universal bailout - and that advice is correct. What NTSB accident data reveals, however, is that the crash often doesn’t happen during the bad approach: it happens during the recovery. The energy trap on short final, combined with plan continuation bias and incorrect execution sequence, makes the go-around one of the highest-risk phases of primary flight training.
Why Do Go-Arounds Cause Accidents?
Go-arounds are statistically one of the highest-risk phases of a training flight - not because the concept is wrong, but because the timing and execution are difficult. The conditions that most demand a go-around are precisely the conditions that make it hardest to execute correctly: low altitude, degraded energy state, and high cognitive load.
The FAA’s accident analysis and NTSB data consistently show the same pattern. A pilot recognizes a bad approach, makes the correct decision to go around, and then executes the recovery poorly. The decision was right. The technique was wrong.
What Is the Energy Trap on Short Final?
The scenario is common. A student on final is fast and high. They pitch up to bleed airspeed, the descent rate steepens, then airspeed builds again in the dive. By short final, energy is disordered - not simply high or low, but oscillating in a way that’s difficult to manage.
When the go-around call finally comes, the airplane is at 50 feet, flaps fully extended, and the throttle goes to full. The nose pitches up from P-factor and torque. The pilot pulls back to establish a climb. But full flaps create significant drag, and the wing must accelerate through that drag before it can generate climbing lift.
The Cessna 172 Skyhawk has a full-flap stall speed of approximately 44 knots and a maximum flap-extended speed of approximately 85 knots. A short-final approach at 65 knots with aggressive pitch-up and full flaps leaves roughly 21 knots of margin - and that margin can vanish in about two seconds with incorrect technique.
This is not a simulated stall. This is a real stall, at 50 feet above the ground, potentially in a drift toward centerline.
What Is the Correct Go-Around Sequence?
The go-around from final has three phases, and the order is not optional.
1. Power first. Full throttle, carb heat off if it was in. Get the engine making maximum power before changing pitch or configuration. Expect the nose to pitch up from propeller torque - hold it back with forward pressure on the yoke until the airplane is accelerating.
2. Attitude second. Once power is established and the airplane is accelerating, set the go-around attitude - a controlled, moderate climb, similar to a short-field departure attitude. The goal at this phase is not maximum climb rate. It’s a safe, flying airplane building airspeed.
3. Flaps third - and incrementally. This is the step that surprises most students. Flaps do not come up all at once. The Pilot’s Operating Handbook specifies the sequence for each aircraft, but the principle is universal: establish a positive rate of climb first, then retract to the first notch, let the airplane accelerate, then retract another notch. Dropping from full flaps to zero in a single motion on short final at 65 knots will briefly reduce lift on an airplane that cannot afford to lose any.
Power. Attitude. Flaps. The Airman Certification Standards require this sequence, in this order, with smooth and controlled inputs. The ACS uses the word “timely” - not late, timely.
How Early Should You Decide to Go Around?
The go-around gets safer with every foot of altitude available when it’s initiated. A go-around called at 500 feet is a categorically different maneuver than one called at 20 feet in the flare. Both decisions can be correct. The margin for error is not the same.
A late go-around - from the flare, from the runway environment itself - demands the most precise execution under the most stressful conditions in primary training. That’s not an argument against doing it. It’s an argument for making the call earlier.
What Is Plan Continuation Bias and How Does It Affect the Go-Around Decision?
Plan continuation bias is a human factors concept describing the psychological pull to keep executing a plan even when conditions have changed. Once a pilot is committed to landing, there is a powerful tendency to keep evaluating the approach rather than abandoning it - even as the window for a safe go-around closes with every foot of descent.
Research from the FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute and the broader human factors community shows that pilots consistently underestimate how quickly approach situations deteriorate. An approach that feels manageable at 300 feet can require commitments that are genuinely unsafe at 50 feet. The incremental nature of the deterioration makes it hard to perceive in real time.
The practical implication: the go-around decision standard must be set before the approach begins, not during it. A decision made on the ground cannot be distorted by the urgency and stress of short final.
How Do Airline Stabilized Approach Standards Apply to Private Pilot Training?
Airline operations use a stabilized approach concept with hard gates. By 500 feet above the airport in instrument meteorological conditions, or 1,000 feet above the airport in visual conditions, the approach must meet specific criteria: on speed, on centerline, on glide path, correct configuration, correct thrust setting. If any criterion is unmet, the go-around is automatic. No deliberation - the decision was made on the ground.
That discipline translates directly to primary training. The exact gates don’t need to match airline standards, but the concept does. Before each flight, establish a personal gate: a specific altitude at which, if the approach is not stabilized to defined parameters, the go-around happens automatically. 500 feet above field elevation is a reasonable starting point for most training environments.
Setting that standard on the ground removes the decision from the worst possible environment for making it.
What Happens If You Go Around on a Short Runway?
Landing long on a short field changes the calculation dramatically. If you’ve crossed the 1,000-foot markers still airborne at 60 knots, the options have narrowed - and the answer depends on math that should have been done before crossing the fence.
The NTSB has found in its analysis of landing-phase accidents at general aviation airports that a significant number of go-around accidents involve aircraft that initiated the recovery after the midpoint of runways shorter than 4,000 feet. Past midfield on a short runway with departure-end obstacles, the geometry no longer favors the go-around. That doesn’t mean don’t do it - in some cases it remains the right call. It means the decision must be made early enough that the obstacle clearance math still works.
Preflight performance planning - knowing the landing distance, studying the airport layout, understanding departure-end obstacles - is what makes that decision possible without doing the calculation in the flare.
What Does the ACS Actually Measure on the Go-Around Task?
The Airman Certification Standards for the go-around and rejected landing task require a timely decision, the correct sequence of power, attitude, and configuration, and the maintenance of positive aircraft control throughout. The examiner is watching the decision process, not just the control inputs. Did you recognize the condition? Did you respond promptly? Did you execute in sequence?
“Timely” is load-bearing language in the ACS. There is no partial credit for almost deciding on short final.
Practical Habits That Make Every Go-Around Safer
Fly every approach as if a go-around is possible. Speed discipline, correct configuration, and situational awareness matter all the way to the flare - a go-around can be required at any point, and the pilot who relaxes when the runway appears is the one who gets surprised.
Brief every approach before flying it. What are your go-around criteria today? What are the obstacles on this runway? What will you do if a go-around becomes necessary right at the fence?
Debrief every go-around. What caused the decision? Was it early enough? Was the sequence correct? What changes on the next approach?
The go-around is not a failure. It is the correct response to an approach that isn’t going to result in a safe landing - and that is exactly the discipline the FAA is certifying.
Key Takeaways
- Go-around accidents are typically caused by late or incorrectly executed recoveries, not the decision itself. The NTSB data shows the crash often follows the correct call.
- The sequence is power, attitude, then flaps - in that order, incrementally. Retracting all flaps at once on short final in a low-energy state risks removing lift the airplane cannot spare.
- A go-around called at 500 feet is a different maneuver than one called at 20 feet. The earlier the call, the greater the margin for any error in execution.
- Plan continuation bias will push you to keep evaluating the approach. Counter it by setting go-around criteria on the ground, before the flight, as a non-negotiable gate.
- On runways shorter than 4,000 feet, going around past midfield changes the geometry significantly. Do the obstacle clearance math before the approach, not during the flare.
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