Copilot warned United 767 was low and slow before Newark light pole strike: NTSB preliminary findings

The first officer aboard United Airlines flight 1757 called out that the Boeing 767-300 was low and slow on approach before it struck an approach lighting pole at Newark Liberty International Airport on January 25, 2025, according to the NTSB preliminary report. The aircraft landed with 166 passengers and crew uninjured, but sustained substantial damage — effectively a total loss from a maintenance standpoint.

What Happened on the Approach to Runway 22L?

The crew was flying an ILS approach to Runway 22L at Newark in challenging weather: ceiling approximately 200 feet and visibility around half a mile in fog. The captain was the pilot flying. The first officer, serving as pilot monitoring, identified that the aircraft had deviated below the glideslope and that airspeed had decayed below the target approach speed.

The first officer made the callout. The approach continued. The aircraft struck an approach lighting structure approximately 1,000 feet before the runway threshold, damaging the underside of the fuselage and landing gear area.

Why Hitting an Approach Light Is a Major Red Flag

Approach lighting systems are positioned in areas where an aircraft on a normal three-degree glideslope should still have significant clearance. Contacting one of those structures means the aircraft was well below the intended flight path — not marginally low, but significantly displaced from where the ILS glideslope should have placed it.

At 200 feet ceiling and half-mile visibility, the crew would have been at or near decision altitude when the strike occurred. This is the most critical phase of any instrument approach, where the decision to land or go around must be made without hesitation.

What Does the NTSB Investigation Still Need to Answer?

The cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder have been recovered and are under analysis. The NTSB has not yet issued a probable cause determination. The key questions remaining:

Why did the approach continue after the “low and slow” callout? Was the response delayed, or did the callout come too late for a correction to keep the aircraft above the obstacle environment?
Were environmental factors involved? Wind shear, gusts, or other conditions that complicated recovery.
Was the crew’s response to the deviation adequate? The monitoring system activated — the question is whether it activated early enough and whether the corrective action matched the urgency.

The FAA has not issued emergency directives related to this event. The NTSB final report is expected to take several more months.

What Every Instrument Pilot Should Take From This

The crew resource management system worked as designed at the detection level. The first officer identified the deviation and spoke up. That is the monitoring pilot doing their job correctly.

The lesson centers on what happens after the callout. A callout only works if the response is immediate. When someone calls “low,” the descent must be arrested. When someone calls “slow,” power must be added. The debrief on why it happened comes after the trajectory is corrected.

The Single-Pilot Reality

For pilots flying single-pilot IFR, this incident underscores what is absent from the cockpit. There is no second set of eyes calling out deviations. The glideslope needle, vertical speed indicator, and airspeed tape serve as the monitoring pilot. The discipline to execute a go-around when those instruments show something wrong must be absolute — especially in low-IMC conditions near decision altitude.

Why Newark Runway 22L Demands Precision

Newark is a demanding airport environment. The ILS approach to Runway 22L crosses heavily developed terrain, and the approach lighting system extends well beyond the threshold because the obstacle environment requires it. Approaches in low-visibility conditions at this airport leave almost no margin for deviation below the glideslope.

Key Takeaways

The first officer’s “low and slow” callout was textbook CRM — the monitoring system detected the deviation as designed
The aircraft struck an approach light pole 1,000 feet short of the runway, indicating significant displacement below the glideslope
A stabilized approach callout demands immediate corrective action — arrest the descent, add power, or go around
Single-pilot IFR operators have no backup voice — instrument scan discipline and go-around commitment must substitute for a monitoring pilot
When an approach is not stabilized near decision altitude, the safest response is always a go-around — the runway will be there on the next attempt

Sources: NTSB preliminary report, AeroTime.