British Airways Flight Fifty-Three Ninety, the Windscreen That Blew Out at Seventeen Thousand Feet, and the Wrong Bolts That Nearly Cost a Captain His Life

On 10 June 1990, the left windscreen blew out of British Airways Flight 5390, a BAC 1-11 climbing through roughly 17,300 feet on a flight from Birmingham, England, to Malaga, Spain. Captain Tim Lancaster was pulled halfway out of the aircraft and held onto by cabin crew for the entire emergency, while First Officer Alastair Atchison flew a rapid descent and diverted to Southampton. All 81 people on board survived, and the investigation traced the cause to a single maintenance error: the windscreen had been reinstalled with the wrong bolts.

What Happened on British Airways Flight 5390

The aircraft was a BAC 1-11, a British-built twin with tail-mounted engines and a staple of short-haul flying at the time. It departed Birmingham bound for Malaga on a clear June morning with 81 souls on board and breakfast service underway.

The crew leveled off in the climb passing about 17,300 feet. The seatbelt signs came off, and a flight steward, Nigel Ogden, stepped into the cockpit. At that moment, the left windscreen departed the aircraft with a bang.

Captain Lancaster was wearing only his lap belt, not his shoulder harness. The explosive decompression pulled him up and out of his seat and through the open window frame. He ended up on the outside of the fuselage - head and torso in a roughly 200-mph slipstream in freezing air - with only his legs still inside, jammed over the control column.

How the Crew Survived the Decompression

Nigel Ogden lunged and grabbed the captain, holding him by the belt and legs with his bare hands. He held on for the entire remainder of the flight, even as the crew came to believe Lancaster had died.

They kept their grip for a grim reason: they feared that if they let go, his body would fall into the tail-mounted left engine. They held on to protect the airplane and everyone else on board.

First Officer Alastair Atchison flew the crippled jet. He could barely hear ATC over the roar, but he initiated a rapid descent to thicker, warmer, breathable air, slowed the aircraft, declared the emergency, and diverted to Southampton - a field he was not especially familiar with and whose runway was on the short side for a 1-11.

He landed safely. Emergency crews met the aircraft, and Lancaster was pulled back inside alive, with frostbite, bruising, shock, and fractures to his arm, thumb, and wrist. Ogden suffered a dislocated shoulder, frostbite, and facial frostnip. There were no fatalities.

Why Did the Windscreen Fail? The Wrong Bolts

The Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) - the British equivalent of the NTSB - found that the failure had nothing to do with the window’s design and everything to do with the maintenance performed about 27 hours before the flight.

The windscreen had been replaced the previous night. A single shift manager did the job himself. On this aircraft, the windscreen bolts on from the outside using roughly 90 bolts around the frame.

To match the replacements, the manager took one old bolt to the parts store. The lighting was poor and he didn’t have his glasses handy for close work. He matched by eye and by feel - and got it wrong.

Of the roughly 90 bolts installed, the vast majority were the wrong size. Most were slightly too small in diameter; a handful were the correct diameter but too short. None held the windscreen to specification.

The window looked perfect and passed a visual glance. It held pressure on the ground and through the early climb. But as the aircraft climbed and the pressure differential grew, the load on those undersized bolts grew with it - until, at around 17,300 feet, they let go.

What the Investigation Found Beyond the One Mistake

A good investigation doesn’t stop at blaming a tired individual, and the AAIB didn’t. It asked why the system allowed the error to reach a departing aircraft.

The findings pointed to a chain of ordinary conditions lining up: one person doing and signing off a flight-critical job alone, parts storage and labeling that made it easy to grab the wrong item, poor lighting, an experienced man trusting his eyes over the parts catalog, and no independent inspection to catch undersized fasteners before return to service.

Why This Matters for Pilots

This incident reshaped how the industry treats critical maintenance, and the lessons apply to anyone who flies an aircraft they don’t personally maintain - which is nearly everyone.

Fasteners are not a detail. A bolt a thirty-second of an inch too small in diameter was the difference between a routine flight and a captain hanging out the window at altitude. A return-to-service signature in a logbook is a promise that the right parts went back on, torqued to spec.

The single-person, no-second-check job is where the risk lives. After 5390, the airline industry leaned hard into independent inspection on critical work and better parts control. In general aviation the lesson scales down but holds: a second look is cheap. An owner who reads the logbook and asks what parts went in adds a real layer of safety - and good mechanics welcome the question.

Wear the shoulder harness. Lancaster came out of his seat partly because he had only the lap belt on. Wear the harness belted and snug from before brake release to after you stop. Structural failures, wake turbulence, and bird strikes give no warning to reach for it.

The Aftermath

Tim Lancaster recovered and was back flying within months. Atchison and Ogden were recognized for their actions, and that particular BAC 1-11 airframe returned to service. As the saying goes on this one: the people held up better than the hardware did.

The details come from the official AAIB report and contemporary accounts from the crew themselves.

Key Takeaways

• On 10 June 1990, the left windscreen blew out of British Airways Flight 5390 (a BAC 1-11) at about 17,300 feet, pulling Captain Tim Lancaster partway out of the aircraft.
• Cabin crew held onto him for the entire emergency while First Officer Alastair Atchison descended and diverted to Southampton; all 81 people survived.
• The cause was a maintenance error: about 90 windscreen bolts were the wrong size, installed by a single shift manager working alone in poor lighting.
• The AAIB faulted the system - no independent inspection, weak parts control - not just one individual.
• The enduring lessons: correct fasteners are safety-critical, critical maintenance needs a second set of eyes, and always wear your shoulder harness.